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Legislative Representation in the USSR 
DA VID DR ESCHER 
University of Kentucky 
Introduction 
The purpo se of thi s paper is to gain a better understanding of the con-
cept of legislative representation in the Soviet Union. In order to ac-
compli sh this, certain definitional obstacle s must be overcome. 
The most basic term in need of definition is the word "legislatu re." 
Nelson Pol sby defined legislatures as being: 
" .. . assemblies whose members meet, deliberate, and 
act collectively as formal equals. He says that legisla-
tures are further distinguished by their standing as of-
ficial rather than private bodies and by the fact that 
their formal enactments are binding on the population 
to which they are accountable and from whom their 
legitimacy emanates." ' 
Michael Mezey defined a legislature as: 
"a predominantly elected body of people that acts col-
lectively and has the formal power but not necessarily 
the exclusive power to enact Jaws that are binding on all 
members of a specific geographic entity. " 2 
Most scholars accept the assumption -that legislatures are instit utions 
that are rooted in representation. 3 Representation may be performed 
through a number of specific legislative roles that have been identifi ed. 
These include: political recruitment, representing the views of constit uents 
to nonlegislative elites in government, informing the public, bureaucratic 
oversight, nation-building, and political integration and legitimizati on.• 
Common to all these discussions of legislatures is the underlying 
acceptance of the assumption that legislatures make laws and act on behalf 
of their constituents . This activity of acting on behalf of a constit uency can 
be referred to as representation. 
Representation can take on several forms and may not involve precisely 
the same activities under all circumstances. 5 Two of the more prominent 
forms of representation are Burkean representation and Liberal representation. 
Edmund Burke argued that representation was too important and 
specialized a function to be left to the ordinary citizen . Legislative represen-
tatives were to be charged with directing society toward a normatively cor-
rect goal. This would require, according to Burke, a capacity for discernment 
not possessed by most citizens. Representatives had to be willing to forego 
short-term and local interests in exchange for long-term national interests. 6 
The Liberal concept of representation rejected the argument that 
legislators must move their societies toward some morally correct goal. For 
the Liberal, representation was a way to serve the specific, immediate needs 
of a particular constituency. Since resources were always scarcer than the 
demand for them, conflict was bound to develop. By institutionalizing com-
petition for these resources in the legislature, resources could be allocated 
without threatening the system ,' 
Robert Weissberg applied the concepts of Burkean and Liberal 
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representation to the American Congressional context using the terms col-
Jective and dyadic representation. 8 The research of Weissberg and Pitkin 
should make the reader aware that dyadic, Liberal representation is not the 
onlY legitimate form of representation available. 
Past legislative research has tended to limit comparative study to 
western political systems. 9 Consequently, eastern European legislatures 
have gone largely unstudied. The discussions collected by Wahlke and 
Eulau and Patterson '0 completely ignore Communist legislatures. In the 
past, students of Communist political systems have tended to regard 
legislatures as irrelevant to policymaking. 11 There is the general assumption 
that these bodies are " ... mere parodies of deliberative bodies ... , "' 2 and 
are hence unworthy of study. 
It is my hypothesis that legislative representation does occur in the 
Soviet Union. I will argue that representation in the Soviet Union is conceived 
of as a more Burkean process than it is in the United States. I do not wish 
to suggest that Soviet legislative representation is totally devoid of 
Liberal overtones. In fact, I will argue that representation is at least partially 
accomplished through constituency-service and oversight. In this paper, I 
will present a justification for studying the Soviet legislative system, the 
constitutional bases of Soviet legislative representation, and an examination 
of constituency-service and legislative oversight of the bureaucracy. 
I 
If a legislature is to have the capability to represent its constituents, it 
must be regarded as legitimate by those constituents. Without this sense of 
legitimacy, citizens will not be able to perceive any of the attempts made by 
legislators to perform the representative function. 
Legislatures in Communist states have gone unstudied largely because 
Westerners have considered these states to be totalitarian political systems that 
offer their citizens few, if any, opportunities for political expression and 
participation. The Soviet Union attempts to portray itself as a democratic 
state, which should involve, at a minimum, the participation of the citizenry 
in the political process. 
In the West, citizen participation is traditionally measured (though not 
exclusively measured) through the level of voter turnout during elections. I 
believe that there is a sufficient amount of Soviet electoral data to suggest 
that there are opportunities for political expression in the Soviet Union. The 
opportunity for political expression may suggest that the citizenry has the 
legitimate ability to present inputs to the larger political system. This, in 
turn, would suggest that decision-making and policymaking in the Soviet 
Union is not a monolithic process and that legislative bodies might serve 
some function in it. 
The 99.0% voter turnout level in the Soviet Union' 3 is obviously incor-
rect. The implications of these turnout statistics, which sometimes exceed 
Gilison's 99.0% average, are simply unbelievable. If they were correct, in 
1975 
"only 27 Turkmens out of 1,156,848 failed to vote. In 
Tadzhikistan the figure given is 65 out of 1.5 million 
and in Kirgizhia 125 out of 1,639,808." 14 
While the official figures are somewhat unbelievable, it would not be 
unreasonable to suggest that legitimate voter turnout statistics would be 
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higher in the Soviet Union than they ·would be in many Western state 
There are almost no impediments to voting in the Soviet Union . A vot! · 
must merely meet the requirements of age and citizenship. The burden 0 } 
registration is on the local soviet rather than the voter himself." Proximity 
to polling stations is not a problem either since 
"voters who expect to travel on election day may simply 
apply for a 'certificate of the right to vote in anot her 
place,' which they can present in any polling place in the 
Soviet Union. In addition, hospitals with more than fifty 
voters have polling stations, as do ships with twenty or 
more vpters, long distance trains, and major air and rai l 
terminals.'" 6 • 
The Soviet political system also makes extensive use of agitator s who 
are charged with informing voters about the candidates and "getti ng out the 
vote". 11 Additionally, "election day is decl;ued a holiday and is scheduled 
for a Sunday ... since Sunday is a general day of rest in the USSR. ' ' 11 This 
serves to further reduce the degree of inconvenience that voters are expected 
to endure. 
Soviet elections are not necessarily r:ubberstamp confirmati ons of can-
didates. Some voters do cast negative ballots q11d occasionally, local level 
candidates are defeated. '9 
Since Soviet elections are very convenient to participate in, and virtually 
impossible to forget to participate in Gilison has suggested that those who 
abstain from voting are engaging in a form of negative input, since these 
elections are supposed to add to the reglme's legitimacy . 20 
"the system demands active involvement, participati on 
that gives visible evidence of one's loyalty ... (I)nac-
tion, purposeful noninvolvement, is just at dispicable as 
negative action. " 21 
The possibility that Soviet elections allow for some degree of political 
expression does e.xist. If traditional conclusions concerning citizen par-
ticipation in the Soviet political system as a whole are incorrect, it is possible 
that traditional conclusion s concerning subsystems, such as the legislative 
network, may also be incorrect. 
II 
The Supreme Soviet of the USSR is the preeminent legislative body in 
the Soviet Union. It is a bicameral body comprised of the Soviet of the 
Union and the Soviet of Nationalities. 22 The Presidium of the Supreme 
Soviet sits at its apex and is 
'' ... elected from among the deputies and consists of 
the chairman, fifteen Deputy Chairmen-one from each 
union republic, the Secretary of the Presidium, and 
twenty-one members of the Presidium of the Supreme 
Soviet of the USSR. " 23 
An integrated system of subordinate level soviets permeates the entire 
nation, extending to the sublocal level. These lower level "Soviets of Peo-
ple' s Deputies" include: 
"the Supreme Soviets of the union republics; the 
Supreme Soviets of the autonomous republics; the ter-
ritorial and provincial Soviets of People's Deputies, the 
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Soviets of People's Deputies of autonomous regions and 
autonomous areas; district, city, (district) city-district, 
settlement and village Soviets of People's Deputies ... " 24 
According to the Constitution of the USSR, this system of soviets 
represents the supreme power of the people of the USSR. 25 The Constitu-
tion of the USSR seems to suggest that representation is conceived to be a 
Burkean process in the Soviet Union. Rather than making explicit reference 
to serving the needs of individual citizens, the Constitution states: 
"(t)he Communist Party of the Soviet Union is the 
leading and guiding force of Soviet society and the 
nucleus of its political system and of (all) state 
organizations. The CPSU exists for the people and 
serves the people. 
Armed with Marxist-Leninist doctrine, the Communist 
Party determines the general perspective of the develop-
ment of the domestic and foreign policy of the USSR, 
directs the great creative activity of the Soviet people, 
and imparts a planned and scientifically sound character 
to their struggle for the victory of Communism . " 26 
This passage from the Soviet Constitution indicates that the govern-
ment of the Soviet Union is to be directed by the CPSU to achieve a specific 
goal, the stage of Communism. V. I. Lenin argued in What is to be Done? 
that the masses were incapable of discerning their own long-range interests, 
and therefore required the direction of a vanguard party. 21 Both the Con-
stitution of the USSR and Lenin's writings appear to be more supportive of 
the Burkean concept of representation than the Liberal one, in that they 
argue in favor of a goal that is presumably considered to be objectively cor-
rect and recognize that the average citizen may not be able to recognize what 
must be done to attain this goal. 
III 
Part II of this paper indicates that the concept of representation is not 
foreign to Soviet political thought. While the Soviet understanding of 
representation may be different from the American understanding of 
representation, the concept itself is legitimate . 
Despite the Burkean nature of representation as it is presented in the 
Constitution of the USSR and in the writings of Lenin, representative ac-
tivity does take place in the Liberal sense of the word as well. 
Constituency service does occur at the local level of Soviet government 
and is an activity that is encouraged by the higher echelons of the govern-
ment. Table 1 indicates the extent to which constituency service is con-
sidered important by the deputies of local soviets. 
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Tulc 1 
Pucy Sta1u ud Attk•des of Loni Dtp•tia toward U11e Uttf•l■est of Titdr Work 
(pttt<■I-) 
U1t.fal Alpedt of 0tp•11 Work 
Work with the mandate of the vo<crs 
Receivin1 voters, consideration or complaints and proposals 
Preparation of questions for sessions of the Soviet 
Preparation of questions ror the Sov iet's caecutive committee 
Wort with the staodin1 commiuions 
Implementat ion in 1hc election distrid of decisions made by 
the Soviet and iu executive committ ee 
Verification of the fulrtllment or aovemmcnt ruoh.uions and 
Party Stauu 
Party 
Member 
Party 
C..dld■tt 
1969 
16.7 
20.4 
8.6 
8.4 
22.l 
1'71 1969 1971 1969 
16.l ll .8 
2) .0 26.l 
7.0 l .l 
8.7 l .l 
18.1 ll ,8 
10.l 10.l 
26.4 )) ,) 
42.2 
ll .7 lO.O 
ll .7 -
No~ 
Al111iotio,, 
1971 1969 In( 
ll .1 18.l 
28.4 2l .4 
l .1 6.l 
l .0 6.l 
27,7 26.0 
9.4 6.7 
11,l 
25,7 
6.l 
4.6 
26,4 
8,0 
decision s made by central and local ora.ans 10.0 10. 7 10 . .S 6.9 4.◄ 7 .0 
A&itadon and propqanda wort ln the election district 5.2 S.9 10.S 16. 7 4.4 -4.0 l .J 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 ioo 
Pcrcent11c or 1969 or 1971 sample accordi.na to Pan y status 56.2 S0.2 t.2 1.6 0 .6 14.2 42.0 lot.0 
No«e: Table is based on answcn to the ques1ion: "Which area of your activities as a dtputy do you considtr the most rru1trut1" Answer, 10 the 
same question are broken down by social Position (in the source below, pp. 168-69). by education (in the source, pp, llS-27), by aae (in the: 
10u.rce, pp. 257- .S9), and by s;e:x (in the source, p, 281). In each case, the authors also provide a perce.nt11e breakdown for the entire S&mp&t{s). 
Sou.rte: 8 . K. Alcksecv and M. N. Pcrfil'ev, Printsipy i tt ndartsii ra.cvitUo pndsto11 ittl 'no10 sosta'IO matnyklr so11tto11 (Lcninlf&d: Lmildll: 
1976), p. 202. ' 
(From Lubrano ti . al. , 1911;.k) 
In response to the question "Which area of your activities as a deputy 
do you consider the most fruitful?" samples taken of local deput ies in both 
1969 and 1971 indicated that considering the complaints and pro posals of 
the voters was consistently ranked either first or second by all the categories 
of deputies listed. In the same time period, all categories of deputies ranked 
working with the mandate of the voters as either second or third in its 
degree of usefulness. While it is difficult to determine what exact ly is meant 
by the term "mandate of the voters", it does appear to be similar to con-
sidering the views of the voters. 
One might raise the question of the validity of a survey undert aken in 
the Soviet Union, given the potentially coercive role of the government. 
While such a concern is legitimate, there does not appear to be any reason to 
believe that the answers provided by the respondents of this survey were 
given simply to please individuals at higher levels of the governme ntal and 
Party structure. In fact, the low scores given to the usefulness of agitation 
and propaganda work for virtually every category of respondent suggests 
that the survey may indeed be legitimate. 
As Friedgut noted, there appears to be a fair degree of reliance by the 
government on agitators in election campaigns. 29 Evidently, the government 
considers such activity to be desirable, and if this survey were intended to 
provide support for official positions one would expect scores for the 
usefulness of agitation and propaganda work to be higher. 
There is also some theoretical basis that would support the legitimacy 
of this survey. Merle Fainsod found that during the 1930s in Smolensk 
Province, citizens routinely utilized the services of their provincial soviet in 
order to have demands satisfied. 30 
James Oliver found that in the cities of Leningrad and Moscow, 
citizens inundated the raion (borough) level soviets with demands. These 
demands, like casework demands placed on American legislators, are of a 
personal or individual nature and do not usually relate to matters of overall 
government policy. 31 
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Table 1 
Dllllnltla Faced by O.,.tla la Local So•l<u A«onllll1 to Sodal Polltloa 
1 ............ 1 
Soda! Polltlo■ 
Worlltn htelllpaula 
l)lllkollla Noted by Local O.,atla Hff 1971 1969 19'71 
Inadequate aencral education and cultural level 4.8 4 .2 0.2 
weakness of professional preparation 2.0 s.o 0.2 0.4 
ranorance or the basics of administration and leaisJation 8.2 9.6 J.4 S.4 
Little life experience 1.6 1.S 0.8 1.0 
AbsenCC of or&ani.u.tional skills 6.0 6.4 0 .4 0 .4 
Litdc e,xpcricncc in dcputorial activities 13.4 20.4 S.6 10.6 
overload in basic work IS.6 14.0 JI.I 36.2 
overload or social commi.uions 7.2 4 .6 IJ .0 14.4 
Rcrnotcnas of dcction district from residence or from place or work 8.4 8.4 1.2 S.8 
Limkadon of deputy riahu 11.6 6.2 17.0 9.8 
Apathy or voters in the district S.8 4.0 7.8 6.0 
At,scnoe or proper information on the status of business in dcction 
nei&hborhoods, in enterprises, and institutions 2.4 2.0 2.0 2.4 
Inattentiveness or separate uccutivc or1ans and officials to qucsiions 
presented to deputies S.2 J.4 7.0 S.6 
1nadcquatc help in work from the standina commissions and 
executive committees 0.8 0.1 0.4 0.4 
(nadeq\lllc help in work from local Party, mass and independent 
,oc:ial oraaniwions l .4 2.2 1.8 1.0 
constant help from local institutions Ul oraanizina the work of deputies J .6 2.0 1.6 0.4 
Tool 100 100 100 100 
Pcrcentqe or 1969 or 1971 sample in each social position 50.0 57.6 45.2 40.2 
•White-oollar personnel ($/wz}tashchic) 
Eaploy .... 
1969 19'71 
1.4 
J . I 
11.0 12.S 
IS .1 
1.4 6.2 
11.0 IS .1 
24.6 9.4 
9.6 J . I 
8.2 9.4 
8.2 9.4 
9.6 6.2 
1.4 
8.2 J . I 
2.6 
1.4 J . I 
1.4 J . I 
100 100 
4.8 2.2 
Note: Table is based on answers to the question: "What kind or difficulties do you find in your work?'' Answers to the same question arc broken 
down by party membership (in the source below, pp. 204--205), by education (in the source, pp. 232-35}, by a,e (in the source, pp. 26'--67), and by 
sex (ln the source, p. 283-M). In each cue, 1he authors aha provide a percentage breakdown for the en1ire sample(s). 
Source: 8. K. AJebeev and M. N. Pcrnl'tv, Prilftsipy i tcndcntsil ra:vitiio pr«Js1ovi1el'no10 sostavo matnyklt sovctov (Leningrad: Lcnizdat, 
19'76), pp. 170-71. 
(from Lubrano tt . ol.; 52-B) 
Table 2 also supports the hypothesis that constituency service is an im-
portant aspect of legislative representation in the USSR at the local level. 
Table 2 indicates that with the exception of deputies who held the social 
position of Employee in 1971 an overload in basic work was either the first 
or second most frequently mentioned difficulty mentioned by deputies 
across social positions in 1969 or 1971. In fact, with the exception of 1971 
workers and employees, it was the most frequently mentioned complaint. 
While "overload in basic work" is not a clearly defined term, I would 
argue that a substantial amount of this basic work is probably concerned 
with constitutent service. Oliver noted that when demands are not responded 
to at one of the local levels, citizens often submit them to higher levels, 
which in turn place pressure on the lower level to respond to the citizen de-
mand. Acording to Oliver, 400Jo of the raion level complaints are handled 
after being submitted to a higher level. 33 
The satisfaction of these demands would indicate that the Soviet 
government approves of citizens making demands on the government. In-
deed, this may be one way in which citizen participation is encouraged. 
Satisfaction of such personal demands would serve the Liberal system main-
taining function of institutionalizing citizen dissatisfaction and distributing 
small quantities of resources in order to maintain the systemic status quo 
without complaint. 
IV 
Legislative representation may also take place through legislative over-
sight of the bureaucracy. The Soviet Constitution makes reference to an 
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oversight function for the Supreme Soviet. 
"The Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities 
elect from among the deputies standing commissions for 
the preliminary consideration and preparation of ques-
tions within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Soviet of 
the USSR and its Presidium, and the supervision of the 
activities of the state organs and organizations. " 34 
"The Supreme Soviet of the USSR supervises the ac-
tivities to all state organs accountable to it." 35 
Lower level soviets are also given powers of oversight. These powers 
are specifically spelled out in Chapters 12 and 15 of the Constituti on of the 
USSR. In these chapters, the operation of the soviets and the functions of 
their ·deputies are stated. 36 
While an oversight function may exist in theory, there is no guarantee 
that this is the case in reality. I believe that there is some evidence that 
theory and reality do converge on the issue of oversight. 
Commlulon (date 
of touadallon) 
Lc&islativc proposaJs (1938) 
International affairs (1938) 
Plannina-budaet (1938)' 
Mandates (1938) 
Economic (Council or Nau) 
(1957-66) 
Industry (1966)1> 
Trari.sport and Communications 
(1966)' 
Construction and buildina 
matcriaJs industry (1966) 
Agriculture (1966) 
CommunaJ economy and 
services ( 1966) 
Health and social $CCUfily (1966) 
Education, science and 
technology ( 1966)c 
Youth (1968) 
Conservuion or nalurc and 
rational use or natural 
resources ( 1970) 
Consumer goodJ (1974) 
Women's work and social 
conditions (1976) 
Joint sessions 
T01al 
'Budget commission until 19.57. 
bScparatcd in 1970. 
4th 
(195'-58) 
0 
18 
Table 3 
The USSR Supreme SovMt: 
S1aadins Commissions, 1954-1979 
Num~r of Mtttln1s fH' Convocalfon 
5th 6tb 7th l<b 
(1951-62) (1962-66) (1966-70) (1970-74) 
2 
22 
4 
25 
IS 
65 
15 
19 
83 
eScparated in 1919 into educa1ion and cultural and sclenct and technology commissions. 
Source: V«Jomosti Vtrkhovnoio Sovtta SSSR, 1954-1919. 
9tll 
(1974-7' ) 
10 
21 
98 
(From White, J980; 259) 
Table 3 indicates that two interesting phenomena have occurr ed since 
1954. First, the number of standing commissions has increased dramatically, 
particularly since 1966. Second, the number of meetings that these commis-
sions have held has also increased. Those commissions that have existed 
since 1954 have met with more frequency particularly since 1966. 38 
If these commissions were merely rubber-stamps with no real oversight 
authority, there would be no reason to increase either their numbers or the 
frequency with which they meet. If these commissions performed nothing 
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rnore th an symboli c duti es with in the Supr eme Soviet, there would be no 
need to main tain th em at an yth ing abo ve a symboli c level. Th e numb er o f 
functio ns that a standing comm ission could be expected to engage in is 
rather limited. Two of the more ob viou s activiti es ar e legislat ive initia tive 
and ove rsight. There is no evidence to suggest that these commi ssion s 
engage in the formulation of legislat ion . 
Table• 
Tbt U R 11pmat So•~ : 
Chartctr.rtsOa o f Otpulla, 1937- 1979 
(In pc:rttat11 tt) 
Party Mtmbfft Aft £J/"ca1lon 
(:oavoctilio■ Wome■ aad Caadldat a: To JO J I...O ,1 . 50 51...0 60+ Hlahu Stto■dary PrimU')' 
ISi ( 1937-46) 16.l 76. 1 2A.9 47.8 21.0 4,l 1.8 21.4 J0.9 47.7 
2nd ( 1946-lO) 20.7 81.0 10. 1 Jl .8 41.l 8.7 4. 1 38.8 29.4 32. 1 
3rd( l9~ l4) 21.l U .l 6.l 2A.8 49.9 14.l 4,J 46.4 28.2 25.4 
41h ( 19l4- l8) 25.8 78.0 8.2 19.2 44.4 2J .6 4.6 ll .4 26.9 17.7 
l th ( 19l 8-62) 26.6 76. 1 1.1 21.8 40.l 2l .2 4 .8 48.7 32.0 19.3 
6th (1962-66) 27.0 7l .8 14.l 28.1 JO. I 22.9 .. l2 .7 36.8 10 .l 
7th ( 1966-70) 28.0 7l .2 12.0 28.6 21.1 25.4 6.3 l3 .3 40.8 l.9 
8th ( 1970- 74) JO.l 12.2 18.l 2J .O 2l .l 21.7 11.3 ll.4 46. 1 2.l 
91h ( 1974- 90) 31,3 12.2 18.4 18.l 28. 1 21.8 13.2 l3 .0 46.0 1.0 
10th (1979- 14) 32.l 11.1 21.1 n.d . n.d n .d n.d . n.d. n.d. n.d. 
Sourcc:s: Vtrkhovn yl Solltt SSSR devyo1010 SOty\<IO (SIOIISlk hak ii sbornik ), pp. 46-.SI; VHomost l Vtrkhow,010 Sowttl SSSR , no. 11 {14 March, 
1979), p. 171. 
(From White; 2.SI) 
Table 4 indicates that there ha s been a steady drop in the per centage of 
Supre me Soviet deputies holding only primary education s. There also seems 
to have been an attempt to maintain the Supreme Soviet member ship at ap-
proxi mately 50% above the secondary education level. While thi s tells us 
nothi ng about oversight in and of itself, it is reasonable to conclude that 
oversi ght could not effectiv ely take place without legislator s who are com -
peten t to understand technically complex information . 
Lrnlof 
Primary only 
Secondary• 
Hiah.,.j 
Tabk S 
R~l« tlon by £d11cotlon 
196' So•~ 
(II) 
82 
600 
Il l 
•1nc:lud.lna incomplete secondary 
flnc:ludina incomplete: tuahc:r. 
12 14.6 
IJO 21.7 
481 l7 .9 
(From Hill, 1972;52) 
Table 5 indicates that between 1966 and 1972, the least frequently 
reelected group of deputies held only primary educations. Those with po st-
secondary educations on the other hand were the most frequently reelected 
member s of the Supreme Soviet. While this does not provide enough infor-
mati on to determine long-term trends, it may indicate some support for the 
hypothesis that educational credentials are becoming more important 
within the Supreme Soviet. 
The reelection of those members of the Supreme Soviet who have bet-
ter education s may be further indicative of the oversight role played by the 
Supre me Soviet. It is difficult to learn the informal rules of any organiza-
tion . In the legislative context, mastering these rule s can be crucial to one's 
71 
success. Those who serve in the Supreme Soviet for only one term are less 
likely to have the opportunity to learn how to perform their jobs effectiv ely. 
By preventing the reelection of those with only primary educatio ns, the 
Soviet political system widens the gap of relative effectiveness between the 
well educated and the poorly educated. 
I believe that the oversight function has been sanctioned by the Soviet 
political system, and has not become more prominent merely as the result of 
better educated deputies seeking to use their skills. The CPSU decides which 
individuals will appear on the ballot on election day, and hence must ap-
prove those individuals with higher levels of education. If these deputie s 
were found to be a difficulty for the system, people of their backg round 
would not be sought after. 
Conclusion 
In this paper, I have attempted to demonstrate that legislative repr esen-
tation is a legitimate activity in the USSR and that it is accomp lished, at 
least partially, through constituency-service and oversig ht of the 
bureaucracy. 
While the information available is probably not sufficient to pro vide 
conclusive evidence for the above hypothesis, it is strongly supportive o f it. 
While the circumstances under which survey data was collected cannot be 
examined for methodological rigor, the information available fro m these 
surveys seems to support the hypotheses of this paper. 
The existence of an oversight function is more reliant on infe rential 
data than is the argument concerning the existence of a constituency service 
function at the local level. However, I believe that the argument prese nted 
in support of the Supreme Soviet's oversight function is plausible. In order 
for this element of the Soviet legislative process to be better underst ood, re-
searchers must devise a method for determining what occurs qua litative ly in 
the standing commissions. The conclusions that have been reache d thu s far 
have made the functionalist assumption that if the number of stan ding com-
missions and their meetings are increasing, something must be being ac-
complished. Such a conclusion is inferential rather than direct, and not 
necessarily definitive. 
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